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Abstract  The  1997  ‘‘Treu  Act’’  reformed  the  Italian  labor  market  ‘‘at  the  margin’’.  This  paper
studies  the  act’s  effects  on  the  ﬂows  out  from  on-the-job-training  contracts  (including  both
‘‘Contratti di  Formazione  Lavoro’’  and  Apprenticeship  Contracts)  into  a  new  labor  market  sta-
tus after  one  year.  Applying  a  multinomial  logit  model  and  Fairlie  decomposition,  our  ﬁndings
suggest that  the  Treu  Reform  has  shifted  ﬁrms’  hiring  preferences  by  changing  the  returns  of
workers’  characteristics.  Moreover,  with  some  differences  between  ‘‘Contratti  di  Formazione
Lavoro’’  and  Apprenticeship  Contracts,  the  Treu  Reform  involved  a  substitution  between  transi-
tions into  a  permanent  job  and  into  a  new  on-the-job-training  contract.  Interestingly,  following
the introduction  of  the  Treu  Reform,  workers  need  to  accumulate  more  experience  in  Appren-
ticeship Contracts  to  achieve  the  same  probability  of  future  employment,  which  suggests  that
Italian ﬁrms  value  the  ﬂexibility  characteristics  of  on-the-job-training  contracts  more  than
their training  content.  The  underlying  lesson  we  can  draw  is  that  in  labor  markets  with  a  weak
demand of  skilled  workers,  policies  aimed  at  promoting  stable  employment  and  avoiding  pre-
carious careers  should  consider  the  effectiveness  of  on-the-job  training  and  monetary  incentive
levels.
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PALABRAS  CLAVE
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Resumen  En  1997,  la  ‘‘ley  Treu’’  reformó  el  mercado  laboral  italiano  ‘‘al  margen’’.  En  este
documento  se  estudian  los  efectos  de  la  ley  sobre  los  ﬂujos  de  los  contratos  de  formación  en
el puesto  de  trabajo  (tanto  contratti  di  formazione  lavoro  como  contratos  de  prácticas)  en
un nuevo  estado  de  mercado  laboral  tras  un  an˜o.  Aplicando  un  modelo  lógit  multinomial  y  la
descomposición  de  Fairlie,  nuestros  hallazgos  indican  que  la  reforma  de  Treu  ha  cambiado  las
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preferencias  de  contratación  de  las  empresas  modiﬁcando  las  características  de  las  ganancias  de
los trabajadores.  Además,  incluyendo  algunas  diferencias  entre  contratti  di  formazione  lavoro
y contratos  de  prácticas,  la  reforma  de  Treu  conllevó  una  sustitución  de  transiciones  por  un
trabajo permanente  y  un  nuevo  contrato  de  formación  en  el  puesto  de  trabajo.  Curiosamente,
según la  introducción  de  la  reforma  de  Treu,  los  trabajadores  deben  acumular  más  experiencia
en contratos  de  prácticas  para  lograr  las  mismas  probabilidades  de  empleo  futuro,  lo  que  indica
que las  empresas  italianas  valoran  la  ﬂexibilidad  de  los  contratos  de  formación  en  el  puesto  de
trabajo más  que  el  contenido  de  la  formación.  La  lección  subyacente  que  podemos  concluir  es
que, en  los  mercados  laborales  con  poca  demanda  de  trabajadores  cualiﬁcados,  las  políticas
destinadas  al  fomento  del  trabajo  estable  y  a  la  evitación  de  las  carreras  precarias  deberían
tener en  cuenta  la  eﬁcacia  de  la  formación  en  el  puesto  de  trabajo  y  los  niveles  de  los  incentivos
económicos.
© 2012  Asociación  Cuadernos  de  Economía.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  Todos  los  dere-
chos reservados.
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markets  in  Europe  more  ﬂexible.4 In  addition  to  creating
Temporary  Agency  Contracts  (TACs)  and  introducing  neg-
ligible  changes  to  FTCs,5 the  reform  substantially  altered1. Introduction
Since  the  1980s,  many  European  labor  markets  have  been
reformed  ‘‘at  the  margin’’  to  reduce  employment  protec-
tion  legislation  that  was  believed  to  be  the  main  reason
for  high  and  persistent  unemployment  among  disadvantaged
groups.  In  this  context,  new  atypical  contractual  forms  have
been  introduced  and  others  have  been  more  largely  applied.
In  Italy,  atypical  contractual  forms  include  both  contracts
merely  aimed  at  reducing  ﬁring  costs,  such  as  ﬁxed-term
contracts  (FTCs)  and  temporary-agency  contracts  (TACs),
and  contracts  more  strictly  devoted  to  make  the  entry  of
youths  into  the  labor  market  easier.  These  contracts,  called
on-the-job-training  contracts  (OJTCs),  combine  lower  ﬁr-
ing  costs  and  speciﬁc  on-the-job  activities  to  train  young
workers.  Italian  OJTCs  include  two  contractual  forms,  the
Contratto  di  Formazione  Lavoro  (CFL)  and  the  apprentice-
ship  contract  (APC),  that  differ  in  terms  of  age  limits  and
contract  duration  (see  Table  1).
The  training  characteristics  and  the  speciﬁc  incentives
often  associated  with  the  transformation  into  permanent
contracts  (PCs)  make  both  OJTCs  a  privileged  channel  to
reach  a  stable  job.  However,  while  the  empirical  litera-
ture  devoted  attention  to  the  stepping-stone  or  trap  role
of  temporary  contracts  in  the  transition  toward  perma-
nent  employment,1 the  speciﬁc  case  of  OJTCs  has  been
scarcely  investigated,  although  these  contracts  are  of  par-
ticular  interest.2
1 Among others, Alba-Ramirez (1998), Amuedo-Dorantes (2000),
D’Addio and Rosholm (2005), Güell and Petrongolo (2007), Amuedo-
Dorantes et al. (2008) have found negative or poor effects.
Conversely, van den Berg et al. (2002) and Ichino et al. (2005)
indicate a ‘‘stepping stone’’ toward permanent jobs. Gagliarducci,
2005 argued that the positive effect is conditional on not experi-
encing temporary work interrupted by long unemployment spells.
2 Booth and Satchell (1994) show the efﬁciency of OJTCs to
provide employer-based general training. Gospel (1994) ﬁnds that
trainees obtain portable skills across ﬁrms. Booth and Satchell
(1994) and Winkelmann (1996) ﬁnd that OJTCs promote longer job
relationships and that on-the-job trained workers experience fewer
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lParticularly,  the  contextual  training  and  ﬂexibility  role
f  OJTCs  possibly  determines  a  trade-off  in  ﬁrms’  hiring
rocess  depending  on  the  role  emphasized  by  the  employ-
rs.  On  the  one  hand,  ﬁrms  should  be  more  prone  to  hire
n-the-job  trained  workers  for  PCs,  both  because  of  the
ncentives  in  the  case  of  transformation  and  because  of
he  speciﬁc  training  provided  to  workers.3 On  the  other
and,  the  lower  ﬁring  costs,  the  determined  length  and  the
ower  pay  associated  with  OJTCs  may  constitute  an  incen-
ive  not  to  transform  the  relationship  into  a  PC.  Thus,  the
robability  of  transition  from  an  OJTC  to  a  PC,  apart  from
orkers’  characteristics,  will  also  depend  on  ﬁrms’  hiring
references  between  the  ﬂexibility  and  training  content  of
JTC.  No  univocal  responses  may  be  given  a  priori,  and  the
revalent  effect  will  depend  on  the  balance  of  opposite
mpulses.
This  paper  attempts  to  disentangle  the  question  focus-
ng  on  the  role  of  OJTCs  in  the  Italian  labor  market  in  the
ontext  of  the  ﬁrst  Italian  reform  ‘‘at  the  margin’’  (Law
96/97,  Treu  Reform  henceforth).  The  Treu  Reform  was
ntroduced  in  1997  to  make  one  of  the  most  rigid  labornemployment spells in the transition to their ﬁrst full-time employ-
ent than other workers.
3 Some discussions about the structure of incentives, training costs
nd training contents that are likely to affect ﬁrms’ hiring deci-
ions are discussed in Harhoff and Kane (1997), Werwatz (2002) and
olter et al. (2007).
4 According to the ofﬁcial statistics, during the period under anal-
sis, the percentage of atypical workers raised, on average, from
0.82% to 11.88% across the pre- and post-reform periods. Because
oung workers are largely over-represented in atypical jobs, the
aise of young atypical workers should be much stronger than 1%. In
he year of the reform, the percentage of atypical workers over all
ubordinate workers increased from 10.76% (January--June 1997) to
1.51% (July--December 1997).
5 The introduction of TACs possibly produces a (negligible) reduc-
ion in transitions to a PC or a new OJTC. Changes in the FTC
egislation are likely to produce only negligible effects.
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Table  1  Atypical  contracts  legislation  and  Treu  Act  modiﬁcations.
Contracts  and  Laws  Pre  reform  legislation  Treu  Act  modiﬁcations
Fixed  Term  Contracts
(FTCs)
L.  230/62,  L.56/87
and  L.  223/91,
L.  196/97;
Fixed  term  contract  with  indeﬁnite
length  without  restrictions  about
duration  (except  for  managers)  or
economic  sector;
Only  one  renewal  of  the  contract  is
admitted;
Possibility  of  increasing  the  duration
of the  contract  (20--30  days)  with
payment  of  additional  wage;
If the  worker  is  rehired  with  a  FTC
before  a  stated  length  of  time  the
contract  is  transformed  into  a  PC;
Reduced  the  time  limits  for  which
re-hiring  with  a  FTC  implies  the
transformation  into  a  PC  by  law
On the  Job  Training
Contracts  (OJTCs)
Apprenticeship
Contracts
(APCs)
L.  25/55,  L.  196/97;
Fixed  term  contract  of  deﬁnite
cumulative  contract  length
(maximum  5  years)  providing  training
activities  on  the  job;
aimed  to  improve  the  employability
of workers  aged  14--20  and  with  low
education,  Duration  of  training  not
speciﬁed;
Applicable  to  limited  sectors;
Fiscal  and  contribution  rebates;
Wage  is  an  increasing  percentage
(with  time)  of  the  wage  of  a  worker
of an  equivalent  professional  level
hired  with  a  PC;
Extended  the  age  limits  to  24;  and
also, to  26  for  areas  deﬁned
‘‘objective  1  and  2’’  by  the  EU;  to  28
for disabled  people;  to  29  for
artisans;
Extended  applicability  to  all
economic  sectors;
Extended  the  applicability  to
medium-qualiﬁed  workers;
Changed  the  contract  length  range:
maximum  4  years  (5  for  artisans);
Increased  on  the  job  training
activities  to  120  h  (for  workers  over
18) --  240  h  (for  workers  underage),
including  off  the  job  training;
Increased  contribution  rebates  in
case  of  transformation  into  a  PC;
CFL
L. 863/84,  L.  451/94,
L. 196/97;
Fixed  term  contract  with  deﬁnite
length  (1  or  2  years)  for  individuals
aged  16--32,  providing  on  the  job
training;
Employer’s  contribution  rebates
(25%-50%)  according  to  area  and  ﬁrm
type;
CFL  type  A  (24  months  duration)
aimed  at  acquiring:
intermediate  professionalism  (80  h  of
training)
high professionalism  (130  h  of
training);
CFL  type  B  (12  months  duration)
aimed  at  the  employment  of  and  the
improvement  in  qualiﬁcation  (20  h  of
training)  of  low  qualiﬁed  workers
Lower  wage  with  respect  to  that  of
workers  hired  by  a  PC  of  equivalent
professional  level;
Extended  CFL  applicability  to  public
research  sector;
Extended  CFL  applicability  to
disabled  people;
Extended,  for  areas  deﬁned
‘‘objective  1  and  2’’  by  the  EU,  the
employer’s  contribution  rebates  for
one year  in  case  of  transformation
into  PC;
Temporary  agency
contracts
(TACs)
L. 196/97;
Introduced  TACs,  a  triangular
contract  in  which  an  agency  hires  a
worker  for  the  purpose  of  making  him
available  to  a  client  ﬁrm  for  a
temporary  assignment.
No  restrictions  on  the  contract
length;
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reduced-form  equation  that  estimates  the  factors  affecting
the  product  of  the  two  probabilities,  i.e.,  the  probability
of  receiving  a  job  offer  and  the  probability  of  accepting  it,
for  workers  in  an  OJTC.  Independent  of  the  original  con-On-the-job-training  contracts  in  Italy  
OJTCs.  Particularly,  the  reform  mainly  acted  in  three  direc-
tions  to  change  OJTCs.  First,  the  reform  extended  the
age  limits  of  their  applicability.  Second,  the  reform  made
training  activities  more  substantial  and  increased  the  penal-
ties  for  employers  eluding  job-training  discipline.  Third,
the  reform  increased  incentives  for  employers  to  transform
OJTCs  into  PCs  (Table  1).
Thus,  although  the  age  limit  extension  potentially
favored  both  the  number  of  workers  potentially  involved
in  OJTCs  and  the  re-application  of  these  contracts  to  the
same  worker,  the  Treu  Reform  mainly  acted  to  increase  the
training  contents  of  OJTCs  and  the  incentives  in  the  case  of
transformation  into  a  PC.  As  a  consequence,  the  transition
probabilities  from  an  OJTC  to  a  PC  should  increase.  Con-
versely,  decreasing  transition  probabilities  would  indicate  a
predominance  of  the  ﬂexibility  role  of  OJTCs  in  Italy.
As  anticipated,  even  though  OJTCs  share  underlying  char-
acteristics  and  principles,  CFLs  and  APCs  were  different  in
the  pre-reform  period  and  were  changed  differently  by  the
Treu  Reform.  For  example,  the  age  extension  concerned
APCs  more  than  CFLs;  because  of  these  differences,  the
transitions  out  of  OJTCs  will  be  investigated  separately.
Therefore,  an  empirical  analysis  is  conducted  to  estimate
the  ﬂows  out  from  CFLs  and  APCs  toward  a  new  labor  mar-
ket  status  and  to  evaluate  whether  and  how  the  introduction
of  the  Treu  Reform  changed  the  transition  probabilities,  with
speciﬁc  attention  to  the  transitions  toward  PCs.6
Particularly,  I  apply  a  Multinomial  Logit  Model  to  Work
Histories  Italian  Panel  (WHIP),  for  the  period  ranging  from
August  1994  to  December  1999,  to  estimate  the  ﬂows  out
from  OJTCs  one  year  after  the  end  of  the  original  contract.7
Further  controls  are  implemented  to  make  my  analysis
more  robust.  First,  a  Chow  test  is  used  to  control  if  the
change  in  the  transition  probabilities  is  directly  imputable
to  the  Treu  Reform.  Second,  and  more  importantly,  I  apply
the  Oaxaca-Blinder  decomposition  for  nonlinear  outcomes
(Fairlie,  2006,  Fairlie  decomposition  henceforth)  to  investi-
gate  the  sources  of  the  potential  change  in  both  the  CFL--PC
and  APC--PC  transitions.  Particularly,  the  Fairlie  decompo-
sition  allows  one  to  determine  if  the  potential  changes  in
both  transitions  are  explained  by  changes  in  worker  charac-
teristics,  for  example,  due  to  the  extended  age  limits,  or
if  they  are  explained  by  changes  in  returns’  characteristics,
indirectly  representing  the  ﬁrms’  hiring  preferences.
According  to  the  estimation  results,  I  ﬁnd  that  the  intro-
duction  of  the  Treu  Reform  involved  a  substitution  between
transitions  into  PCs  and  into  both  of  the  new  OJTCs.  Never-
theless,  transitions  between  the  different  OJTCs  appear  to
be  quite  negligible,  even  though  CFL--APC  transitions  have
increased  in  the  post-reform  period.
6 Scarce literature focused on the Treu reform and mainly
concentrated on TACs or temporary contracts as a whole. The lit-
erature includes Montanino and Sestito (2003), Ichino et al. (2005),
Destefanis and Fonseca (2007) and Jiménez-Rodríguez and Russo
(2008).
7 Because we are estimating the transitions one year after the end
of the original contract, we use information for which the original
contract ended by December 1998 and for which the destination
contract is observable.
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According  to  the  Fairlie  decomposition,  the  substitu-
ion  effect  is  explained  more  by  changes  in  returns  in
he  workers’  characteristics  than  by  changes  in  the  work-
rs’  characteristics  implied  by  the  reform.  I  also  ﬁnd  that
he  Treu  reform  smoothed  the  human  capital  accumulation
ffect.  This  ﬁnding  indicates  that  OJTC  workers  (particu-
arly  apprenticeships)  need  to  accumulate  a  longer  contract
ength,  and  hence  more  training  and  more  experience,  to
chieve  the  same  employment  probability.  Moreover,  this
nding  possibly  indicates  that  ﬁrms  test  workers  for  a  longer
eriod  of  time  before  converting  their  contract  into  PCs.
hese  ﬁndings  suggest  that,  in  the  Italian  labor  market,
t  least  for  manual  professions,  ﬁrms  are  more  prone  to
se  OJTCs  because  of  their  ﬂexibility  characteristics  than
ecause  of  their  training  content.  A  possible  explanation
s  the  structure  of  the  Italian  labor  demand.  In  fact,  the
talian  labor  market  is  historically  characterized  by  a  weak
emand  of  skilled  workers,  for  example,  because  of  the
mall  mean  size  of  ﬁrms  (Baldini  and  Toso,  2009).  This  ﬁnd-
ng  means  that,  at  least  for  manual  professions,  the  stronger
emand  for  unskilled  workers  lowers  the  advantages  of  hir-
ng  trainees.  Finally,  my  ﬁndings  open  questions  about  the
ffectiveness  of  on-the-job  training  and  of  monetary  incen-
ives  with  respect  to  transforming  OJTCs  into  PCs.
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.
ection  2 provides  the  empirical  speciﬁcation.  Section  3
escribes  the  data,  while  Section  4  presents  the  results.  Sec-
ion  4.2  provides  the  robustness  checks  of  the  econometric
nalysis.  Finally,  conclusions  follow  in  Section  5.
.  The model
he  probability  of  changing  from  an  OJTC  (a  CFL  or  an  APC)
oward  a  new  labor  market  status  (namely,  a non-working
tatus,  a  permanent  contract,  or  a  CFL  or  apprenticeship
ontract)  is  estimated  by  applying  a  Multinomial  Logit  Model
MNL)  pooled  over  time.  The  MNL  model  relies  on  the
ssumption  of  independence  of  irrelevant  alternatives  (IIA),
or  which  the  odds  of  preferring  a choice  over  another  do  not
epend  on  the  presence  or  absence  of  other  ‘‘irrelevant’’
lternatives.8 The  MNL  model  allows  me  to  analyze  a8 The critical implication of the IIA is that unobserved factors
re assumed to be uncorrelated over alternatives and to have the
ame variance for all alternatives. In case of correlation, the IIA
s violated. The IIA could be relaxed by applying a mixed MNL
dopting, for example, the GLLAMMs program written in STATA by
abe-Hesketh et al. (2004). Unfortunately, for our analysis, the
aximization process does not converge; hence, we are unable
o control for unobservable heterogeneity and for possible corre-
ations among unobservable factors leading to the violation of the
IA. In any case, in a previous version of this paper where CFL and
PCs were analyzed jointly, the estimation results obtained from a
tandard MNL and a mixed MNL possibly differed in magnitude and,
ometimes, in signiﬁcance but not in the essence.
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The  units  of  observations  related  to  the  transitions  after
12  months  are  7841  (5983  individuals),  4695  of  which  refer
to  the  pre-reform  period.  Regarding  the  OJTC  type,  1/3  of72  
ract  (CFL  or  APC),  let  j  denote  the  J  possible  categories  of
 polytomous  response  variable9 and  i denote  the  agent.
The  multinomial  probabilities  associated  with  each
esponse  can  be  derived  by  assuming  that  an  unobserved
tility  Uij is  associated  with  each  alternative  and  that  the
lternative  with  the  highest  utility  is  selected.  Thus,  the
robability  that  the  choice  j  is  made  is  the  following:
ij =  Pr(Yi =  j)  =  Pr(Uij >  Uik ∀j  /=  k)i (1)
he  utility  of  choice  j  is  modeled  as  follows:
ijt =  xijtˇj +  εijt (2)
here  j,  in  turn,  refers  to  NW  (non-working  condition,  our
ase  category),  PC,  new  CFL,  or  APC  if  the  original  contract
s  a  CFL  and  to  NW,  PC,  CFL,  or  a  new  APC  if  the  original
ontract  is  an  apprenticeship  contract.
Moreover,  xijt is  a  vector  of  explanatory  variables  includ-
ng  individual  and  job-related  characteristics  as  well  as  a
acro-economic  indicator;  ˇj is  a  vector  of  unknown  param-
ters;  and  the  εijt are  time-varying  i.i.d  error  terms.  If  the
ijt follow  the  type  I  extreme  value  distribution,  the  prob-
bility  of  transition  in  status  j  at  time  t  has  a  multinomial
ogit  form:
ijt =  Pr(Yit =  j|X)  = exp(x
′
itˇj)
1  +∑J
j=2 exp(x
′
itˇj)
(3)
here  j  =  1  is  selected  as  base  category  and  the  ˇ1 =  0  condi-
ion  is  imposed  for  identiﬁcation  purposes.
The  model  is  estimated  by  maximum  likelihood.  The
robability  of  an  individual  i  choosing  the  alternative  that
e/she  was  actually  observed  to  choose  can  be  expressed  as
ollows:
J
j=1
[
exp(x ′itˇj)
1  +∑J
j=2 exp(xitˇj)
]yij
(4)
where  yij takes  the  value  of  one  if  individual  i  chooses
;  otherwise,  it  takes  the  value  of  zero.  Assuming  that  the
bservations  are  independent,  the  likelihood  for  N  observa-
ions  may  be  written  as  follows:
N
i=1
J∏
j=1
[
exp(x ′itˇj)
1  +∑J
j=2 exp(x
′
itˇj)
]yij
(5)
Taking  the  log  of  this  equation  results  in  the  following
og-likelihood  function
n  L(ˇ)  =
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
yij ln
[
exp(x ′itˇj)
1  +∑J
j=2 exp(x
′
itˇj)
]
(6)
Because  some  omitted  individual  characteristics  may
ause  observations  within  individuals  to  be  correlated  over
ime,  the  usual  standard  error  may  be  incorrect.  Thus,  these
rrors  are  replaced  in  all  standard  estimations  by  robust
tandard  errors  (Huber--White  Sandwich  estimator)  with  an
dditional  correction  for  the  effects  of  clustered  data.
9 It is convenient to think of these categories as alternatives and
he response among alternatives even if the response does not
trictly represent a choice.
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. Data description and source of bias
.1.  Data  description
he  sub-sample  used  in  our  analysis  is  selected  by  the
HIP  dataset,  in  its  standard  version,  provided  by  the
‘Laboratorio  Riccardo  Revelli’’.  WHIP  is  a  database  of  indi-
idual  working  histories,  based  on  the  National  Institute  of
ocial  Security  (INPS)  administrative  archives,  and  consists
f  a  representative  sample  with  a  dynamic  population  of
70.000  individuals.  The  database  provides  full  information
rom  1985  to  1999;  however,  I  used  only  the  information
rom  August  1994  (when  Law  451/94  was  introduced)10 to
999  for  homogeneity  purposes  from  a  legislative  point  of
iew.  For  the  sake  of  homogeneity,  I  only  included  individuals
ged  16--32.  Even  if  the  data  only  reach  1999,  the  use  of  this
ataset  is  recommended  for  at  least  three  reasons.  First,  the
ataset  provides  monthly  information  on  private  employ-
ent  relationships;  therefore,  I can  reconstruct  the  time
f  transitions  with  good  precision.  Second,  OJTCs  are  recog-
izable  with  respect  to  other  atypical  contracts.  Third,  the
ata  allow  a  comparison  between  the  pre-  and  post-reform
eriods.
Flows  out  of  the  original  OJTC  are  the  units  of  observa-
ions.  The  after-one-year  transitions  control  the  new  status
f  the  worker  exactly  one  year  after  the  current  OJTC
nded.  As  anticipated  above,  in  Italy,  OJTCs  include  Appren-
iceship  Contracts  and  ‘‘Contratti  di  Formazione  Lavoro’’11;
hese  two  types  of  contracts  are  quite  similar:  both  oblige
mployers  to  provide  job  training  (on  the  job  and/or  off
he  job)  to  the  employees,  and  they  allow  ﬁrms  to  pay
educed  contributions.  Differences  concern  contract  length,
ge  limits,  hours  of  training  that  employers  must  provide  and
onetary  incentive  levels.
For  each  sampled  individual,  the  single  employment  rela-
ionship  is  identiﬁed  by  the  type  of  contribution  rebate
aid  to  the  INPS.  Employer  contributions  allow  us  to  iden-
ify  the  contract  type  for  each  individual.  In  particular,  in
he  database,  I  can  distinguish  between  the  contribution
ebates  relative  to  a  permanent  contract  and  three  types
f  contribution  rebates  related  to  atypical  contracts  (CFLs,
PCs  and  TACs).  It  is  still  not  possible  to  identify  individuals
mployed  with  FTCs  because  according  to  Italian  legisla-
ion  they  do  not  beneﬁt  from  a  reduction  of  contribution
ebates;  thus,  they  are  included  jointly  with  PCs.12 Finally,
nly  yearly  information  is  available  for  Co.Co.Co.  contracts,
hich  are  classiﬁed  as  self-employed  by  the  Italian  legisla-
ion.  Individuals  with  Co.Co.Co.  contracts  are  removed  from
y  sample.10 This law has brought the last change in the labor market before
he Treu reform, modifying the FTC discipline.
11 The CFL is deﬁned as a ﬁxed-term contractual form to hire young
orkers aged 16--32. Firms hiring workers under the CFL regulation
re obliged to provide theoretical and practical training on the job
nd beneﬁt in a reduction in the contribution rebates.
12 Possible biases due to FTCs and Co.Co.Co. contract data prob-
ems are discussed in the appendix.
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than  the  reduction  in  OJTC--PC  transitions;  hence,  conclu-
sions  about  a  reduction  of  OJTC--PC  transitions  should  be
conservative.  From  an  analytical  point  of  view,  this  thesis
13 Because the diffusion of FTCs is likely to be higher among young
workers, while our data refers to all workers, our reasoning could be
based on misleading information. Even though we  cannot exclude
that the percentages of FTCs among young workers could be higher,
there is no particular reason to believe that the trend in the pre-On-the-job-training  contracts  in  Italy  
the  sampled  individuals  are  employed  with  a  CFL  and  2/3  are
employed  with  an  APC,  with  a  slight  decrease  of  the  former
contractual  form  in  the  post-reform  period.
The  transition  probability  from  generic  OJTCs  to  another
labor  market  status  is  estimated  in  terms  of  a  set  of
covariates  affecting  workers’  and  ﬁrms’  behavior.  The  age
variable  is  introduced  in  a  nonlinear  way.  Gender  and  terri-
torial  dummies  were  introduced  to  control  for  the  presence
of  a  disadvantaged  position  in  the  labor  market  that  is
also  imputable  to  the  demand  side.  Professional  dummy
variables,  when  their  use  is  possible,  allow  us  to  catch  pos-
sible  differences  due  to  workers’  skills  or  speciﬁc  contract
characteristics.  Economic  sector  dummies  intend  to  isolate
speciﬁc  effects  for  economic  sectors  that  are  more  likely
to  be  characterized  by  a  short-term  job  relationship.  The
wage  variable  (expressed  in  daily  terms)  possibly  allows
us  to  catch  the  individual  productivity  in  the  original  job;
meanwhile,  a  part-time  dummy  is  introduced  to  recognize
possible  discrimination  in  transitions  for  part-timers.  The
illness  dummy  is  intended  to  control  for  possible  health-
problem  effects.  The  actual  OJTC  length  and  experience
variables  were  introduced  in  a  nonlinear  way.  Both  varia-
bles  allow  us  to  control  for  the  effects  of  training  and  job
experience  accumulation,  distinguishing  between  speciﬁc
within-ﬁrm  effects  and  no-within-ﬁrm  effects.  Neverthe-
less,  when  accounting  for  previous  OJTCs  experiences,  we
do  not  distinguish  between  CFLs  and  APCs.  Finally,  the
future  rate  of  local  employment  growth  is  introduced  under
the  assumption  of  rational  expectations,  allowing  to  catch
macroeconomic  conditions.
Table  2  shows  descriptive  statistics  divided  by  period  and
type  of  OJTC.  Their  values  refer  to  the  original  contract,
and  in  the  case  of  time-varying  covariates,  I  considered  the
value  at  the  end  of  the  original  contract.  Examining  Table  2,
we  are  able  to  discover  some  differences  between  CFLs  and
APCs.  Obviously,  CFL  workers  are,  on  average,  older  than
APC  workers.  Moreover,  differences  emerge  in  terms  of  terri-
torial  distribution,  sector,  previous  wage  (APC  workers  earn
less  than  CFL  workers),  illness  periods  and  previous  OJTC
experience.
Table  3  provides  information  about  observed  after-
one-year  transitions,  distinguishing  between  pre-  and
post-reform  periods,  distinguished  by  the  original  contract.
Following  the  introduction  of  the  Treu  reform  in  June  1997,
the  instantaneous  transitions  into  NW  states  have  slightly
increased  for  individuals  leaving  a  CFL  and  have  slightly
decreased  for  individuals  leaving  a  PAC;  transitions  into
PCs  have  decreased  (from  43.7%  to  32.5%  for  workers  leav-
ing  a  CFL  and  from  19.8%  to  15.2%  for  those  leaving  an
APC)  and  transitions  into  new  OJTCs  (both  CFL  and  APC)
have  increased.  Transitions  between  the  different  OJTCs
are  quite  negligible,  although  the  CFL--APC  transitions  have
increased  in  the  post-reform  period.  Transitions  into  TACs
are  negligible.  Moreover,  further  information  concerning  the
transition  rates  for  speciﬁc  individual  characteristics  is  pro-
vided  in  Tables  6A  and  6B.
3.2.  Sources  of  biasBecause  WHIP  data  only  provide  yearly  information  about
Co.Co.Co.  contracts  and  include  FTCs  among  PCs,  their
treatment  in  my  analysis  is  likely  to  be  a  source  of  bias.
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Not  considering  Co.Co.Co.  contracts  raises  the  possibil-
ty  that  some  ﬂows  identiﬁed  as  transitions  to  a  non-working
tatus  are  actually  transitions  to  a  Co.Co.Co.  contract.  Thus,
o  avoid  an  over-estimation  of  the  OJTC--NW  ﬂows,  individ-
als  with  at  least  one  experience  with  a  Co.Co.Co.  contract
re  removed  from  the  sample.  Consequent  selection  prob-
ems  are  likely  to  be  negligible  because  only  approximately
%  of  the  observations  belonging  to  individuals  with  at
east  one  Co.Co.Co.  contract  experience  are  deleted  from
he  sample.  Furthermore,  descriptive  statistics  related  to
nrestricted  and  restricted  samples  are  rather  stable,  the
stimated  coefﬁcients  maintain  their  signs,  and  their  dimen-
ions  are  affected  only  slightly.
Including  FTCs  into  PCs  means  that  the  observed
JTC--PC  transitions  actually  include  both  transitions  into
‘true  PCs,  indicated  as  TPCs’’  as  well  as  into  FTCs
PC  =  TPC  +  FTC).  Thus,  the  transitions  into  TPCs  could  be
ver-estimated.  What  is  the  magnitude  of  the  bias?  The
vailable  information  appears  to  indicate  that  the  over-
stimation  is  quite  small.  According  to  Tronti  and  Ceccato
2004),  in  2003,  FTCs  represented  6.7%  of  all  contracts  and
he  use  of  FTCs  has  increased  during  the  second  half  of  the
990s  (+6.2%  per  year  from  1996  to  2003).13 Thus,  in  the
eriod  1994--1999  (the  years  under  investigation),  FTCs  are
ikely  to  represent  a  percentage  of  all  contracts  smaller  than
.7%.  In  contrast,  PCs  made  up  76.1%  in  2003  (76.6%  in  2002),
nd  considering  their  relative  decreased  use  in  previous
ears,  it  is  possible  to  conclude  that  in  the  period  1994--1999
heir  percentage  of  the  overall  sample  was  greater  than
6.1%.  To  summarize,  in  2003,  FTCs  made  up  approximately
.8%  of  PCs.  Thus,  given  the  increasing  use  of  FTCs  and  the
ecreasing  use  of  PCs  in  previous  years,  it  is  possible  to  con-
lude  that  the  percentage  of  FTCs  with  respect  to  PCs  was
maller  than  8.8%  in  the  analyzed  period.  However,  the  most
mportant  issue  is  the  effect  of  the  over-estimation  of  the
JTC--PC  transitions.  Using  previous  information,  given  that
he  use  of  FTCs  has  increased  during  the  second  half  of  the
990s,  it  is  possible  to  conclude  that  the  over-estimation
f  the  transitions  to  a  TPC  is  greater  in  the  post-Reform
eriod.  My  results  show  a  reduction  in  the  OJTC--PC  transi-
ions;  thus,  considering  the  above,  it  is  likely  that  a  greater
eduction  in  the  OJTC--TPC  transitions  would  be  found  if
PCs  were  observable.  In  fact,  according  to  my  results  and
o  Tronti  and  Ceccato  (2004)’s  ﬁndings,  it  is  possible  to
onclude  that  OJTC--PC  transitions  have  decreased  in  the
ost-Reform  period,  while  the  use  of  FTCs  has  increased.
herefore,  it  is  possible  to  conclude  that  in  the  post-Reform
eriod,  the  reduction  in  OJTC--TPC  transitions  is  greaternd post-reform period for young workers is much different from
hat observed in the whole data. Thus, while it is likely that the
ercentages differ, it is unlikely that the essence and conclusions
f our reasoning are incorrect.
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Table  2  Descriptive  statistics.
Cﬂ  APC
All  Pre-reform  Post-reform  All  Pre-reform  Post-reform
Mean  Std  Dev.  Mean  Std  Dev.  Mean  Std  Dev.  Mean  Std  Dev.  Mean  Std  Dev.  Mean  Std  Dev.
Age  24.243  3.039  23.855  2.846  24.859  3.231  18.852  2.004  18.639  1.776  19.160  2.260
Gender (Male  =  1)  0.693  0.461  0.691  0.462  0.697  0.4680  0.476  0.471  0.677  0.468  0.652  0.476
North-West 0.262  0.440  0.277  0.448  0.239  0.426  0.257  0.437  0.261  0.439  0.250  0.433
North-East 0.330  0.4170  0.349  0.477  0.3300  0.458  0.4910  0.492  0.405  0.491  0.417  0.493
Center 0.190  0.392  0.187  0.3920  0.194  0.16  0.16  0.381  0.169  0.375  0.186  0.389
South-Islands 0.218  0.413  0.187  0.390  0.267  0.3  0.157  0.14  0.14  0.371  0.147  0.354
Blue-collar 0.760  0.427  0.787  0.409  0.718  0.450  --  --  --  --  --  --
White-Collar 0.240  0.427  0.213  0.409  0.282  0.450  --  --  --  --  --  --
Manufacturing 0.471  0.499  0.497  0.500  0.429  0.495  0.467  0.499  0.471  0.499  0.461  0.499
Building 0.138  0.345  0.3450  0.347  0.365  0.3  0.162  0.368  0.164  0.370  0.159  0.365
Tourism 0.060  0.238  0.053  0.225  0.1  0.07  0.161  0.368  0.3570  0.17  0.177  0.382
Other sectors  0.331  0.471  0.3310  0.463  0.364  0.41  0.2040  0.408  0.215  0.411  0.204  0.403
Daily wage  (euros)  52.293  47.947  50.166  36.771  36.0072  61.542  33.5441  36.0072  33.544  16.880  36.007  28.636
Part-time 0.081  0.273  0.2730  0.255  0.098  0.297  0.2730  0.138  0.0810  0.101  0.033  0.178
Illness period  0.145  0.352  0.148  0.356  0.1450  0.347  0.058  0.05  0.055  0.229  0.063  0.243
OJTC length  (months)  10.187  9.001  9.777  8.975  10.838  9.0019  10.346  13.858  11.124  14.198  9.222  13.275
Previous OJTC  experience  (months)  7.702  13.660  8.240  14.315  6.848  12.509  3.843  8.532  3.819  8.373  3.877  8.759
Expected employment  growth  0.811  0.732  0.548  0.640  1.229  0.672  0.822  0.774  0.5480  0.698  1.317  0.590
Treu reform  0.386  0.487  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.000  0.409  0.492  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.000
Source:  My elaboration on WHIP data.
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Table  3  Observed  transitions  from  OJTC.
CFL  APC
NW  PC  CFL  APC  TAC  NW  PC  CFL  APC  TAC
Pre-reform  770  704  121  16  1708  612  70  694
47.80% 43.70%  7.51%  0.99%  --  55.38%  19.84%  2.27%  22.50%  --
Post-reform 502  329  141  41  1  1120  324  58  626  4
49.51% 32.45% 13.91% 5.20% 0.10%  52.53%  15.20%  2.72%  29.36%  0.19%
Total 1272  1033  262  57  1  2828  936  128  1320  4
48.46% 39.35%  9.98%  2.17%  0.04%  54.22%  17.94%  25.31%  25.31%  0.08%
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aSource:  My elaboration on WHIP data.
could  be  presented  as  follows:
PC  =  (PCNT −  PCT)  =  (TPCNT +  FTCNT)  −  (TPCT +  FTCT)
=  (TPCNT +  TPCT)  −  (FTCNT +  FTCT)
It  follows  that  PC  =  TPC  +  FTC;  hence,
TPC  =  PC  −  FTC  According  to  my  previous  ﬁndings,
PCNT >  PCT ⇒  PC  >  0
FTCNT <  FTCT ⇒  FTC  <  0
therefore,
TPC  >  PC
4. Estimation results
4.1.  Multinomial  logit  estimates
Estimation  results  are  obtained  by  non-restricted  models,
which  are  the  parameterization  that  includes  a  Treu  reform
dummy  and  the  relevant  interaction  dummies  because  this
solution  is  the  best  for  ﬁtting  the  data.  In  fact,  the  likelihood
ratio  tests  reject  the  null  hypothesis  concerning  the  equal-
ity  between  the  restricted  and  the  less  restricted  model
(that  includes  the  Treu  reform  dummy)  and  the  equality
between  the  less  restricted  and  the  non-restricted  model
s
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Table  4  LR  tests.
CFL  
Model  A  restricte
LR  chi2 df  Prob.  >  chi2
Model  A  vs  Model  B  62.40  3  0.000  
Model B  vs  Model  C  74.76  48  0.000  
Source:  My elaboration on WHIP data.see  Table  4).  This  fact  justiﬁes  the  introduction  of  esti-
ates  comparing  the  pre-  and  post-Reform  situation  using
wo  different  groups.
Tables  5A  and  5B  show  estimates  relative  to  the  MNL
odels  for  12  months  after  the  transitions  for  workers  leav-
ng  a CFL  and  for  workers  leaving  an  APC,  respectively.
Examining  Table  5A  (i.e.,  workers  leaving  a CFL),  esti-
ates  show  a  typical  inverted  U  effect  for  the  age  variable
or  OJTC--PC  transitions,  while  a  similar  effect  is  found
ust  with  regard  to  CFL--APC  transitions  in  the  post-reform
eriod.  Being  male  increases  the  probability  of  CFL--PC
ransitions  in  the  pre-reform  period  by  11.7%,  whereas
n  the  post-reform  period,  the  estimates  are  not  signiﬁ-
ant.  Being  male  also  increases  the  probability  of  CFL--CFL
ransitions;  moreover,  this  positive  impact  has  increased
from  +1.4%  to  +5.9%)  following  the  introduction  of  the
reu  Reform.  Conversely,  in  the  post-reform  period,  being
ale  signiﬁcantly  (and  slightly)  reduces  the  probability  of
 CFL--APC  transition.  Territorial  duality  in  the  Italian  labor
arket  is  conﬁrmed  by  our  estimates.  The  probability  of
FL--PC  transitions  is  higher  for  Northern  workers  and  lower
or  the  Southern  ones;  nevertheless,  the  Treu  Reform  has
ontributed  to  reduce  the  territorial  gap.  No  signiﬁcant  evi-
ence  emerges  for  other  investigated  transitions  besides
he  fact  that  Southern  workers  are  less  likely  to  transi-
ion  from  a  CFL  to  an  APC.  Examining  the  profession,  we
nd  that  CFL  blue-collar  workers  are  less  likely  to  transition
oward  a  PC  compared  with  white-collar  workers.  The  neg-
tive  effect  slightly  decreases  in  the  post-reform  period.  A
imilar  negative  impact  is  found  for  the  CFL--CFL  transitions
f  blue-collar  workers  in  the  post-reform  period.  Economic
ector  dummies  are  rarely  signiﬁcant  for  workers  leaving
 CFL.  In  the  pre-reform  period,  being  a  worker  employed
APC
d  model,  Model  C:  unrestricted  model
LR  chi2 df  Prob.  >  chi2
14.34  3  0.003
89.08  45  0.000
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Table  5A  Pooled  multinomial  logit  estimates.  Original  contract:  CFL.
Destination contract: Pre-reform Post-reform
PC CFL APC PC CFL APC
Coef. r.s.e. mfx Coef. r.s.e. mfx Coef. r.s.e. mfx Coef. r.s.e. mfx Coef. r.s.e. mfx Coef. r.s.e. mfx
Age 0.642 0.278 **  0.139 0.574 0.588 0.019 2.740 2.5446 0.000 0.333 0.345 0.058 0.253 0.382 0.014 3.547 1.670 ** 0.009
Age  square −0.013 0.006 **  −3.003 −0.013 0.012 0.000 −0.090 0.064 0.000 −0.007 0.007 −0.001 −0.006 0.008 0.000 −0.089 0.038 ** 0.000
Gender  (Male =  1) 0.536 0.131 *** 0.117 0.455 0.250 * 0.014 −0.603 00.677 0.000 0.243 0.183 0.027 0.569 0.242 ** 0.059 −0.770 0.448 * −0.002
North-West  0.648 0.167 *** 0.168 −0.265 0.321 −0.039 −0.630 0.820 0.000 0.575 0.240 ** 0.118 0.170 0.307 −0.005 −0.361 0.604 −0.002
North-East  0.489 0.173 *** 0.110 0.327 0.286 0.007 −1.808 1.371 0.000 0.710 0.232 *** 0.142 0.284 0.295 0.002 0.254 0.505 0.000
South-Islands  −0.668 0.187 *** −0.150 −0.433 0.340 −0.008 −2.045 1.341 0.000 −0.418 0.266 −0.087 −0.062 0.326 0.012 −1.870 0.805 ** −0.005
Blue-collar  −0.356 0.153 **  −0.087 −0.014 0.269 0.011 1.178 1.044 0.000 −0.425 0.192 ** −0065 −0.618 0.260 ** −0.056 0.342 0.496 0.002
Manufacturing  0.098 0.140 0.023 0.025 0.238 −0.001 0.019 0.752 0.000 0.153 0.185 0.015 0.409 0.249 *  0.043 −0.098 0.415 −0.001
Building  −0.446 0.195 **  −0.097 −0.407 0.337 −0.013 −1.152 1.155 0.000 0.247 0.259 0.051 0.073 0.360 −0.002 −0.754 0.727 −0.002
Tourism  −0.225 0.282 −0.047 −0.245 0.462 −0.009 −13.043 0.887 *** −0.001 −0.126 0.386 −0.015 −0.290 0.488 −0.030 0.566 0.699 0.002
Daily  wage 0.004 0.002 * 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.000 −0.017 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 −0.002 0.003 0.000
Part-time  −0.395 0.232 * −.092 −0.150 0.480 0.003 0.110 1.378 0.000 −0.515 0.282 * −0.079 −0.705 0.415 *  −0.062 −1.535 0.810 * −0.003
Tenure  0.048 0.012 *** 0.011 0.024 0.021 0.000 0.194 0.101 * 0.000 0.111 0.029 *** 0.025 −0.022 0.018 −0.008 0.279 0.093 *** 0.001
Tenure  square −0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.003 −0.003 0.000 −0.003 0.001 *** −0.001 0.000 0.000 *  0.000 −0.014 0.004 *** 0.000
OJTC  experience 0.001 0.010 −0.001 0.046 0.023 ** 0.003 −0.002 0.087 0.000 0.041 0.016 *** 0.009 0.002 0.021 −0.002 0.136 0.044 *** 0.000
OJTC  experience square 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.002 0.000 −0.001 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.003 0.001 *** 0.001
Expected  employment growth 0.137 0.100 0.034 −0.003 0.173 −0.005 1.132 0.858 0.000 −0.082 0.131 −0.025 0.156 0.168 0.023 −0.532 0.373 −0.001
Constant  −8.980 3.359 *** −8.843 7.017 −210.694 25.417 −4.948 4.268 −3.952 4.680 −36.053 18.014 **
Predicated  probability 43.79% 7.38% 0.04% 32.26% 14.31% 0.26%
Wald  chi2(54) 1184.6 150.6
Prob  > chi2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo  R2 0.082 0.096
Log  pseudolikehood −1411.9 −1023.9
Source:  My elaboration on WHIP data.
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Table  5B  Pooled  multinomial  logit  estimates.  Original  contract:  APC.
Destination contract Pre-reform Post-reform
PC CFL APC PC CFL APC
Coef r.s.e mfx Coef r.s.e mfx Coef r.s.e mfx Coef r.s.e mfx Coef r.s.e mfx Coef r.s.e mfx
Age −0.045 0.396 0.006 2.101 1.396 0.027 −0.501 0.684 −0.080 0.763 0.418 * 0.103 1.160 0.668 * 0.018 −0.415 0.338 −0.119
Age  square 0.004 0.010 0.001 −0.047 0.034 −0.001 0.001 0.019 0.000 −0.015 0.010 −0.002 −0.019 0.016 0.000 0.007 0.008 0.002
Gender (Male = 1) −0.238 0.118 ** −0.036 −0.411 0.313 −0.005 0.052 0.116 0.017 0.229 0.154 0.018 −0.424 0.319 −0.008 0.257 0.123 ** 0.045
North-West 0.632 0.160 ***  0.093 0.888 0.427 ** 0.010 −0.045 0.158 -- 0.031 0.575 0.212 *** 0.066 0.161 0.429 0.001 0.039 0.167 −0.015
North-East  0.759 0.164 *** 0.102 0.857 0.477 * 0.008 0.256 0.153 * 0.011 0.592 0.203 *** 0.052 0.477 0.386 0.004 0.422 0.151 *** 0.061
South-Islands  −1.055 0.226 *** −0.116 −0.840 0.636 −0.005 −1.102 0.200 *** −0.131 −1.016 0.324 *** −0.080 −0.498 0.599 −0.001 −0.993 0.238 *** −0.160
Manufacturing  0.454 0.139 *** 0.069 0.530 0.338 0.006 −0.090 0.134 −0.031 −0.138 0.188 0.026 0.009 0.356 0.001 −0.242 0.154 −0.054
Building −0.169 0.185 −0.022 0.623 0.433 0.008 −0.122 0.172 −0.014 −0.253 0.251 −0.022 −0.145 0.548 −0.001 −0.185 0.196 −0.027
Tourism 0.300 0.190 0.042 −0.485 0.677 −0.007  0.091 0.168 0.005 −0.044 0.237 0.008 −1.387 0.647 ** −0.021 −0.254 0.189 −0.044
Daily  wage 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.000 −0.001 0.004 0.000 −0.001 0.002 0.000 −0.004 0.004 0.000 −0.007 0.004 * −0.001
Part-time  −1.448 0.656 ** −0.154 −13.285 0.395 *** −0.158 −0.874 0.597 −0.053 −0.076 0.393 −0.004 −0.397 0.846 −0.006 −0.096 0.302 −0.015
Illness  period −0.007 0.218 −0.012 0.591 0.451 0.007 0.280 0.215 0.042 0.302 0.253 0.033 0.301 0.517 0.004 0.042 0.216 −0.004
Tenure 0.053 0.010 ***  0.005 0.062 0.022 *** 0.000 0.073 0.015 *** 0.009 0.033 0.011 *** 0.002 0.032 0.029 0.000 0.060 0.014 *** 0.011
Tenure  square −0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 −0.001 0.000 ** 0.000 −0.002 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000 *** 0.000
OJTC  experience 0.054 0.014 *** 0.006 0.073 0.026 *** 0.001 0.040 0.018 ** 0.004 0.042 0.016 *** 0.004 0.019 0.028 0.000 0.035 0.020 * 0.005
OJTC  experience square 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.001 0.000
Expected  employment
growth
−0.325 0.097 *** −0.054 −0.035 0.324 0.000 0.188 0.096 ** 0.040 −0.051 0.145 −0.011 0.102 0.305 0.001 0.126 0.105 0.027
Constant  −2.639 3.920 −27.681 14.049 ** 7.444 6.196 −11.019 4.219 *** −18.710 7.101 *** 4.549 3.351
Predicted  probability 18.04% 1.24% 18.93% 13.62% 1.59% 28.33%
Wald  chi2(51) 2402.9 304.1
Prob  > chi2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo  R2 0.119 0.084
Log  pseudolikelihood −2.907.5 −2110.6
Source:  My elaboration on WHIP data.
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n  the  building  sector  reduces  the  probability  of  a  CFL--PC
ransition  by  10%.  The  wage  level  in  the  starting  CFL  also
ncreases  the  probability  of  CFL--PC  transitions,  possibly  as
 consequence  of  higher  productivity  measured  by  the  wage
ariable.  Conversely,  having  experienced  illness  periods  in
he  post-reform  period  reduces  the  probability  of  transi-
ions  both  toward  an  APC  and,  particularly,  toward  a  PC.
enure  positively  affects  the  probability  of  CFL--PC  tran-
itions  in  the  pre-reform  period  and  of  both  CFL--PC  and
FL--APC  transitions  in  the  post-reform  period,  suggesting
 human  capital  accumulation  effect.14 Interestingly,  the
nverted  U  effect  increases  after  the  introduction  of  the
reu  Reform  for  CFL--PC  transitions.  This  result  indicates
hat  a  CFL  worker  needs  less  experience  to  transit  to  a
C.  We  anticipate  that  even  though  the  inverted  U  effect  is
onﬁrmed  for  the  ﬂows  out  from  APCs,  in  that  case  the  intro-
uction  of  the  Treu  Reform  has  reduced  the  human  capital
ccumulation  effect.  This  assumption  suggests  a  different
ehavior  between  the  different  OJTCs.  Examining  the  role
f  previous  OJTC  experiences,  we  ﬁnd  a  signiﬁcant  effect
articularly  in  the  post-reform  period,  suggesting  again  a
uman  capital  accumulation  effect.  Particularly,  previous
xperiences  affect  the  CFL--PC  and  the  CFL--APC  transi-
ions  following  an  inverted  U  effect.  This  ﬁnding  possibly
ndicates  that  accumulating  previous  job  training  is  posi-
ively  perceived  by  ﬁrms  as  a  factor  of  greater  productivity
ecause  of  job-speciﬁc/job-unspeciﬁc  experiences.  How-
ver,  once  again,  the  effect  of  the  Treu  Reform  is  opposed  to
hat  of  APC--PC  transitions  (Table  5B).  Finally,  Table  5A  indi-
ates  the  predicted  transition  probabilities  starting  from  a
FL.  The  predicted  values  conﬁrm  that  the  introduction  of
he  Treu  Reform  has  reduced  the  transitions  toward  a  PC
from  43.8%  to  32.3%),  has  increased  the  transitions  toward
 new  CFL  (from  7.4%  to  14.3%)  and  has  a  negligible  effect  on
he  CFL--APC  transitions.  This  result  suggests  that  the  Treu
eform  has  involved  a  substitution  between  transitions  into
 PC  and  into  a  new  CFL.
Table  5B  contains  estimates  for  the  sub-samples  of  work-
rs  leaving  an  APC.  We  ﬁnd  that  in  the  post-reform  period,
he  probability  of  being  employed,  one  year  later,  in  a  per-
anent  relationship  or  with  a  CFL  increases  as  age  increases.
eing  male  appears  to  be  less  relevant  for  workers  leaving
 CFL.  The  impact  is  signiﬁcant  (and  negative)  for  APC--PC
ransitions  in  the  pre-reform  period  and  signiﬁcant  (and  pos-
tive)  for  APC--APC  transitions.  As  we  have  previously  found
or  CFL  as  well  as  for  APC  ﬂows  out,  we  ﬁnd  evidence  of  ter-
itorial  duality.  The  probability  of  being  employed  one  year
fter  the  end  of  an  APC  is  higher  in  the  Northern  regions  and
ower  in  the  Southern  regions.  When  signiﬁcant,  the  effect
s  particularly  stronger  for  transitions  toward  a  PC  and  a
ew  APC.  In  the  pre-reform  period,  concerning  the  APC--PC
ransitions,  the  positive  effect  (with  respect  to  the  base  cat-
gory,  the  Italian  central  regions)  of  working  in  the  North
est  was  equal  to  9.3%  and  equal  to  10.2%  for  working  in
he  North  East.  Conversely,  the  negative  effect  for  working
n  the  South  was  equal  to  11.6%.  Although  a  duality  emerges
lso  for  the  post-reform  period,  the  gap  has  decreased.  In
act,  the  positive  effects  for  North  West  and  North  East
14 This ﬁnding is consistent with Montanino’s and Sestito’s (2003)
esults on TAC effects.
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ere  equal  to  6.6%  and  5.2%,  respectively,  and  the  negative
ffect  for  the  South  was  equal  to  8%.  Differently  from  what
merged  for  the  APC--PC  transitions,  the  territorial  dual-
ty  for  the  APC--APC  transitions  has  increased.  Concerning
he  economic  sectors,  we  ﬁnd  a  signiﬁcant  effect  (+6.9%)
n  the  pre-reform  period  for  the  manufacturing  dummy  for
ransitions  toward  a  PC  and  a signiﬁcant  effect  (−2.1%)  in
he  post-reform  period  for  the  APC--CFL  transitions  for  the
ourism  dummy.  The  wage  variable  estimate  is  only  sig-
iﬁcant  (and  negative)  for  the  APC--APC  transitions  in  the
ost-reform  period,  while  being  employed  as  a  part-timer
egatively  affects  the  probability  of  reaching  a  PC  or  a  CFL
n  the  pre-reform  period.  This  result  is  possibly  suggesting  a
arginalization  for  part-time  workers.  Concerning  tenure,
s  explained  above,  we  found  evidence  of  a  human  capi-
al  accumulation  effect.  However,  this  effect  has  decreased
fter  the  introduction  of  the  Treu  Reform,  possibly  as  a
onsequence  of  the  extension  of  the  age  limits  for  the  appli-
ation  of  APCs  and/or  suggesting  a  loss  of  effectiveness  of
n-the-job  training  in  APCs.  Although  not  always  signiﬁcant,
revious  accumulated  job  training  increases  the  probability
f  moving  to  a  new  job,  suggesting  that  previous  OJTC  expe-
iences  do  not  reduce  the  probability  of  ﬁnding  a  permanent
ob.  In  fact,  repeated  previous  OJTC  experiences  not  trans-
ormed  into  a  PC  relationship  may  send  bad  signals  about
orkers’  ability;  however,  these  signals  may  be  counter-
ailed  by  later  employment  positions  because  the  workers
ave  already  been  re-tested  by  other  ﬁrms.  In  addition,
umulative  job  training  likely  makes  ﬁrms  more  prone  to
ire  workers  with  some  job  experiences  rather  than  individ-
als  without  any  training.  Quite  surprisingly,  the  expected
mployment  growth  variable,  if  signiﬁcant  (and  before  the
ntroduction  of  the  Treu  Reform),  shows  a  positive  effect
or  the  APC--APC  transitions  and  a  negative  effect  for  the
PC--PC  transitions.  Finally,  Table  5B  shows  the  predicted
ransition  probabilities  starting  from  an  APC.  As  above,  the
redicted  values  conﬁrm  that  the  introduction  of  the  Treu
eform  has  reduced  the  transitions  toward  a  PC  (from  18.1%
o  13.6%),  has  increased  the  transitions  toward  a  new  APC
from  18.9%  to  28.3%)  and  has  a negligible  effect  on  the
PC--CFL  transitions.  Once  again,  this  result  suggests  that
he  Treu  Reform  has  involved  a  substitution  between  transi-
ions  into  a  PC  and  into  a  new  APC.
The  obtained  estimation  results  are  applied  to  the  mean
alues  of  the  set  of  covariates  to  obtain  the  estimated  values
f  transition  probabilities,  distinguishing  between  pre-  and
ost-reform  periods.  As  a  further  conﬁrmation  of  the  good-
ess  of  the  estimation  results,  the  observed  and  computed
ransition  probabilities  move  in  the  same  direction  and  dif-
erences  in  magnitude  are  quite  small.  Here,  for  brevity,
 only  comment  on  the  more  interesting  predicted  values
Tables  6A  and  6B).
Generally,  although  with  different  magnitudes,  the  intro-
uction  of  the  Treu  Reform  has  been  followed  by  a  reduction
n  the  transitions  toward  a  PC,  independent  of  the  original
ontract,  and  a  relevant  increase  in  the  transitions  toward
ew  OJTCs.  Transitions  toward  NW  conditions  have  usually
ncreased  if  the  original  contract  was  a  CFL  and  have  usually
ecreased  if  the  original  contract  was  an  APC.
From  a  gender  perspective  (Table  6A),  men  have  expe-
ienced  an  increase  in  the  CFL--NW  transitions  (from  44.8%
o  50.6%)  and  a  reduction  in  the  CFL--PC  transitions  (from
On-the-job-training  contracts  in  Italy  179
Table  6A  Observed  and  predicted  transitions  from  CFL  and  APC.
Characteristics  Destination:  CFL  APC
NW  PC  CFL  APC  TAC  NW  PC  CFL  APC  TAC
Male
Observed
Pre-reform 44.56% 46.63%  8.00%  0.81%  --  56.06%  18.53% 2.20%  23.22%  --
Post-reform  47.24% 33.95%  15.28%  3.39%  0.14%  51.33%  15.31% 2.08%  31.20%  0.07%
Predicted
Pre-reform 44.79% 47.40%  7.79%  0.02%  --  62.51%  16.91% 1.10%  19.48%  --
Post-reform 50.59% 33.04% 16.17% 0.01% --  54.52%  14.24% 1.33%  29.91%  --
Female
Observed
Pre-reform 55.02% 37.15%  6.43%  1.41%  --  53.97%  22.61% 2.41%  21.01%  --
Post-reform 54.72% 28.99% 10.75% 5.54% -- 54.79%  14.98% 3.91%  25.91%  0.40%
Predicted
Pre-reform  57.80% 35.80%  6.38%  0.01%  --  60.05%  20.60% 1.59%  17.76%  --
Post-reform  58.75% 30.11%  10.64%  0.01%  --  59.90%  12.45% 2.24%  25.41%  --
North-West
Observed
Pre-reform  39.91% 53.59%  4.93%  1.57%  --  49.81%  26.46% 3.35%  20.37%  --
Post-reform  42.46% 39.26%  14.88%  2.89%  0.41%  48.97%  19.70% 2.63%  28.33%  0.38%
Predicted
Pre-reform  40.16% 54.98%  4.85%  0.01%  --  56.85%  23.16% 1.79%  18.20%  --
Post-reform  46.69% 39.97%  13.36%  0.27%  --  53.59%  18.04% 1.51%  26.86%  --
North-East
Observed
Pre-reform  40.93% 48.75%  9.43%  0.89%  --  47.60%  21.28% 2.48%  28.46%  --
Post-reform  38.49% 40.46%  14.14%  6.91%  --  44.99%  16.54% 2.92%  35.55%  --
Predicted
Pre-reform  41.91% 48.93%  9.15%  0.01%  --  51.93%  24.02% 1.58%  22.47%  --
Post-reform  43.40% 42.22%  13.91%  0.01%  --  47.26%  16.19% 1.82%  34.72%  --
Center
Observed
Pre-reform  52.32% 38.41%  8.28%  0.99%  --  59.58%  16.86% 1.53%  22.03%  --
Post-reform  54.82% 27.41%  13.71%  4.06%  --  55.67%  12.59% 2.77%  28.72%  0.25%
Predicted
Pre-reform  53.37% 38.21%  8.40%  0.01%  --  63.92%  13.84% 0.01%  21.41%  --
Post-reform  57.87% 27.68%  13.96%  0.01%  --  58.99%  11.18% 1.41%  28.41%  --
South-Islands
Observed
Pre-reform  67.77% 24.92%  6.98%  0.33%  --  79.09%  8.88%  0.79%  11.24%  --
Post-reform 64.21%  21.03%  12.92%  1.85%  --  76.04%  7.03%  2.24%  14.38%  0.32%
Pre-reform  68.07% 25.09%  6.93%  0.01%  --  83.88%  6.32%  0.01%  9.33%  --
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tPredicted Post-reform 64.80%  20.41%  
Source: My elaboration on WHIP data.
47.4%  to  33.1%).  Conversely,  models  predict  a  reduction  in
the  APC--NW  transitions  (from  62.5%  to  54.5%).  Women  have
experienced  smaller  changes  in  the  CFL  ﬂows  out,  while
the  APC  ﬂows  out  are  more  robust.  For  example,  APC--PC
transitions  have  decreased  from  20.6%  to  12.5%.  Evidence
concerning  working  areas  is  reported  in  Table  6A.  North-
western  workers  have  experienced  an  increase  in  CFL--NW
transitions  and  a  slightly  decrease  in  APC--NW  transitions.
These  workers  also  have  experienced  a  strong  fall  in  the
CFL--PC  transitions  (from  55%  to  40%).  Northeastern  work-
ers  have  experienced  a  similar  trend;  however,  for  workers
starting  from  an  APC,  the  effects  have  been  stronger  than
for  those  starting  from  a  CFL.  A  great  reduction  of  CFL--PC
transitions  is  also  found  for  Central  workers  (from  38.2%  to
27.7%).  Southern  workers  have  experienced  a  reduction  both
in  the  transitions  toward  NW  and  PC  conditions,  whereas  the
transitions  toward  new  OJTCs  have  increased.  As  explained
before,  it  follows  that  the  Treu  Reform  has  reduced  the
gap  to  the  Northern  regions.  In  any  case,  the  gap  remains
signiﬁcant  in  absolute  terms.
Table  6B  focuses  on  age,  profession  and  tenure.  Concern-
ing  the  age  variable,  we  consider  individuals  aged  up  to
20  years  and  individuals  aged  more  than  20  years.  Among
the  individuals  aged  up  to  20  years,  the  transitions  toward
NW  conditions  have  been  reduced,  independent  of  the  start-
ing  OJTC.  CFL--PC  transitions  have  slightly  increased  (from
30.1%  to  34.7%),  whereas  APC--PC  transitions  have  slightly
decreased  (by  approximately  4%).  Transitions  toward  a CFL
have  remained  stable,  whereas  transitions  toward  APCs  have
increased,  possibly  as  a  consequence  of  the  extension  of
age  limits.  Older  workers  (aged  21--32)  have  experienced  an
increase  in  the  transitions  toward  NW  conditions  if  start-
ing  from  a  CFL  and  a  reduction  if  starting  from  an  APC.
Transitions  toward  a  PC  have  strongly  decreased  (−14%  if
starting  from  a  CFL  and  −10%  if  starting  from  an  APC).
i
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R.70%  0.01%  --  79.26%  5.44%  1.15%  14.15%  --
ransitions  toward  new  OJTCs  have  increased,  suggesting
gain  a  substitution  effect.  Profession  is  only  analyzed  for
ndividuals  starting  with  a  CFL.  Independent  of  the  pro-
essional  level  (blue  or  white  collar),  the  Treu  Reform
as  reduced  the  transitions  toward  PCs  and  has  increased
he  transitions  toward  new  CFLs.  In  any  case,  the  transi-
ion  rate  toward  PCs  has  remained  higher  for  white-collar
orkers  than  for  blue-collar  workers.  Finally,  we  consider
he  tenure  variable.  The  model  predicts  that,  starting
rom  a  CFL,  transitions  toward  NW  conditions  have  slightly
ncreased  (or  remained  stable)  for  short  tenures  (maximum
2  months)  while  they  have  increased  strongly  (+20%)  for
onger  tenures  (more  than  2  years).  At  the  same  time,  tran-
itions  toward  a  PC  have  decreased  independent  of  the
enure  and  have  decreased  strongly  (from  43.7%  to  19.6%)
or  tenures  longer  than  2  years.  Transitions  toward  CFLs
ave  slightly  increased.  This  result  suggests  that  the  intro-
uction  of  the  Treu  Reform  has  emphasized  the  ﬂexibility
ole  of  CFLs.  Examining  APCs,  the  trend  is  similar  but  less
ramatic.  The  transition  rates  toward  NW  conditions  have
ometimes  decreased,  while  the  reduction  in  the  transition
ates  toward  PCs  has  only  slightly  decreased  (3--5%).  Transi-
ions  toward  new  APCs  have  increased  strongly  (9--11%).
.2.  Robustness  checks
 robustness  check  that  I  run  to  control  the  consistency  of
revious  results  is  the  Chow  test.  Particularly,  this  test  is
erformed  to  control  if  the  change  in  transition  probabili-
ies  is  due  to  the  introduction  of  the  Reform  or,  conversely,
s  explained  by  other  evolutions  of  labor  market  conditions.
wo  streams  of  Chow  tests  are  used.  First,  I  test  the  sta-
ility  of  the  parameters  (the  null  hypothesis)  across  the
eform,  using  a  cut-off  point  in  correspondence  with  the
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Table  6B  Observed  and  predicted  transitions  from  CFL  and  APC.
Characteristics  Destination:  CFL  APC
NW  PC  CFL  APC  TAC  NW  PC  CFL  APC  TAC
Aged  up  to  20
Observed
Pre-reform  55.95%  29.76%  7.74%  6.55%  --  56.31%  16.71%  1.84%  25.14%  --
Post-reform 50.00%  28.41%  7.95%  13.64%  --  53.31%  12.14%  1.41%  33.14%  --
Predicted
Pre-reform 59.93%  30.12%  7.96%  1.98%  --  59.47%  16.26%  1.35%  22.91%  --
Post-reform 52.28%  34.74%  7.68%  5.30%  --  55.15%  11.94%  1.33%  31.58%
Aged more  than  20
Observed
Pre-reform  46.85%  45.32%  7.48%  0.35%  --  49.40%  40.00%  5.06%  5.40%  0.00%
Post-reform 49.46%  32.83%  14.47%  9.13%  0.11%  50.43%  23.48%  6.26%  19.13%  0.70%
Predicted
Pre-reform 47.31%  45.27%  7.34%  0.01%  --  60.42%  29.54%  2.18%  7.86%  --
Post-reform 52.57%  31.53%  14.76%  1.13%  --  54.34%  19.90%  5.24%  20.53%
Blue collar
Observed
Pre-reform  48.74%  42.27%  7.81%  1.18%  --
Post-reform  51.37%  31.04%  12.91%  4.53%  0.14%
Predicted
Pre-reform  50.45%  41.94%  7.61%  0.01%  --
Post-reform  56.50%  30.41%  12.77%  0.01%  --
White collar
Observed
Pre-reform  44.31%  48.98%  6.41%  0.29%  --
Post-reform  44.76%  36.01%  16.43%  2.80%  --
Predicted
Pre-reform  42.73%  50.73%  6.53%  0.01%  --
Post-reform  44.52%  36.64%  18.67%  0.01%  --
0--6 months
Observed
Pre-reform  52.02%  39.33%  8.09%  0.56%  --  57.88%  14.57%  1.70%  25.85%
Post-reform 52.50%  27.00%  15.50%  7.00%  --  5%2.43%  11.95%  2.43%  29.79%  0.15%
Predicted
Pre-reform 53.55%  38.83%  7.62%  0.01%  --  66.46%  14.42%  1.19%  17.92%  --
Post-reform 56.40%  27.24%  15.96%  0.01%  --  6.85%  11.48%  1.58%  26.85%  --
7--12 months
Observed
Pre-reform  47.03%  43.93%  7.75%  1.29%  --  54.41%  22.17%  1.26%  22.17%  --
Post-reform 46.36%  34.55%  14.09%  5.00%  --  47.72%  17.89%  1.75%  32.28%  0.35%
Predicted
Pre-reform 48.27%  43.44%  3.44%  0.01%  --  57.66%  19.37%  0.01%  22.40%  --
Post-reform 48.22%  36.83%  14.45%  0.01%  --  49.84%  15.66%  0.01%  33.62%  --
13--24 months
Observed
Pre-reform  41.70%  50.64%  6.38%  1.28%  --  51.21%  22.86%  2.64%  23.30%  --
Post-reform 46.26%  38.50%  12.19%  2.77%  0.28%  47.01%  15.54%  5.18%  32.27%  --
Predicted
Pre-reform 40.98%  52.48%  6.53%  0.01%  --  52.04%  19.99%  1.22%  26.75%  --
Post-reform 48.02%  39.38%  12.21%  0.01%  --  47.95%  14.02%  2.64%  35.38%  --
>24 months
Observed
Pre-reform  51.35%  37.84%  8.11%  2.70%  --  50.85%  34.83%  4.91%  9.40%  --
Post-reform 69.70%  18.18%  12.12%  0.42%  --  46.25%  30.00%  2.92%  2%0.42%  0.42%
Predicted
Pre-reform 47.83%  43.67%  8.40%  0.01%  --  50.90%  30.63%  2.09%  16.38%  --
Post-reform 67.71%  19.60%  12.69%  0.01%  --  46.08%  25.58%  1.18%  27.16%  --
Source:  My elaboration on WHIP data.
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Table  7  Chow  tests.
Reform  reference  Compared
period
CFL  APC
Transition
toward
chi2 df  Prob  >  chi2 Transition
toward
chi2 df  Prob  >  chi2
H0:  stability  of  parameters
Across  reform
period
(Full  Sample)
August  1994  to
June  1997
PC  26.96  18  0.080  PC  28.10  17  0.044
vs CFL  15.84  18  0.604  CFL  258.60  17  0.000
July 1997  to
December  1999
APC  331.18  18  0.000  APC  46.90  17  0.000
January 1997
to  June  1997
PC  27.03  17  0.058  PC  15.95  16  0.457
vs CFL  2047.70  17  0.000  CFL  276.39  16  0.000
July 1997  to
December  1997
APC  2030.52  17  0.000  APC  357.10  16  0.000
Pre reform  period  August  1994  to
December  1995
PC  16.83  18  0.466  PC  22.15  17  0.186
vs CFL  12.79  18  0.804  CFL  28.98  17  0.035
January 1996
to  June  1997
APC  348.04  18  0.000  APC  282.74  17  0.000
Post reform  period  July  1997  to
December  1997
PC  15.09  17  0.589  PC  23.03  16  0.149
vs CFL  17.80  17  0.402  CFL  550.30  16  0.000
January 1998  to
December  1998
APC  701.86  17  0.000  APC  18.48  16  0.297
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individuals  moving  to  a  new  employment  position  (a  PC
or  a  new  OJTC),  excluding  observations  related  to  transi-
tions  toward  a  non-working  status  and  the  residual  OJTC.16
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NNT
⎤
⎦
⎡
NT∑ T T NT∑ T NT ⎤Source:  My elaboration on WHIP data.
Note: Bold fonts refer to the chi2 tests supporting the hypothesis 
introduction  of  the  Reform.  In  this  case,  I  should  expect
a  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  if  the  introduction  of
the  Treu  Reform  changed  the  estimated  coefﬁcients.  Sec-
ond,  I  test  the  stability  of  the  parameters  between  a  set
of  homogenous  sub-periods,  i.e.,  either  fully  belonging  to
the  pre-Reform  period  or  fully  belonging  to  the  post-Reform
period.  In  this  case,  I  should  expect  a  non-rejection  of  the
null  hypothesis  because  the  tested  periods  are  not  affected
by  any  reform  and  the  parameters  should  be  stable.  The
results  reported  in  Table  7  are  quite  encouraging.  In  fact,
quite  encouragingly  and  despite  some  exceptions,  the  ﬁrst
stream  of  Chow  tests  tends  to  reject  the  hypothesis  of  sta-
bility  while  the  second  stream  tends  to  not  reject  the  null
hypothesis.
A  second  robustness  check  that  I  use  is  the  Fairlie  decom-
position  technique.15 This  technique  allows  uncovering  the
sources  of  the  OJTC--PC  transition  probability  differentials
across  the  Reform,  distinguishing  between  the  explained  and
the  unexplained  part.  Particularly,  the  explained  part  rep-
resents  the  change  in  OJTC--PC  transitions  due  to  changes
in  individual  characteristics,  including  those  brought  by
the  introduction  of  the  Reform  (such  as  the  increase  in
age  limits).  The  unexplained  part  represents  the  change
15 The Fairlie decomposition reads as follows:
P
r
mstructural break in June 1997 and stability in other periods.
n  OJTC--PC  transitions  due  to  changes  in  returns’  char-
cteristics.  Because  individual  characteristics  are  given,  a
hift  in  ﬁrms’  hiring  preferences  determining  a  decrease  in
JTC--PC  transitions  may  be  consistent  only  with  a  reduc-
ion  in  characteristics’  returns  of  individuals.  Thus,  if  the
nexplained  part  is  a  component  of  the  observed  decrease
n  the  post-reform  OJTC--PC  transitions,  it  will  also  depend
n  labor-demand-side  effects.
However,  because  the  decomposition  is  only  allowed  for
inary  outcomes,  I only  apply  it  to  a  restricted  sample  of+ ⎣
i=1
F(X
i
ˆˇ )
NT
−
i=1
F(X
i
ˆˇ )
NT
⎦ .
 is the probability of transitioning to a PC, T indicates the post-
eform period and NT the pre-reform period.
16 The dependent variable takes the value one if the individual
oves toward a PC and zero if the value moves toward a new
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Table  8  Fairlie  decomposition.
Model  Observed  Fairlie  decomposition  Predicted
Pre-reform Post-reform  Raw  differential  Explained  %  explained  Pre-reform  Post-reform
CFL
Logit  0.8533  0.7000  0.1533  −0.0095  −6.17  0.8690  0.7109
Probit 0.8533  0.7000  0.1533  −0.0100  −6.54  0.8662  0.7071
Heckman probit  0.8533  0.7000  0.1533  −0.0090  −5.90  0.8662  0.7073
APC
Logit 0.4686 0.3411 0.1276 0.127  32.66  0.4934  0.3277
Probit 0.4686 0.3411 0.1276 0.4 34.81 0.4888 0.3309
Heckman probit 0.4686 0.3411 0.1276 0.33 30.83 0.4897 0.3314
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aSource:  My elaboration on WHIP data.
ccording  to  previous  evidence,  both  for  transitions  toward
 CFL  or  an  APC,  a  decrease  in  the  probability  of  employment
ith  a  PC  is  found  after  the  introduction  of  the  Treu  Reform
Table  8).  Particularly,  considering  only  transitions  into  new
mployment,  observable  CFL--PC  transitions  have  decreased
rom  85.3%  to  70%  and  observable  APC--PC  transitions  have
ecreased  from  46.9%  to  34.1%  after  the  introduction  of  the
reu  Reform.  The  Fairlie  decomposition  is  computed  with
eference  to  three  possible  binary  outcome  model  speciﬁca-
ions:  a  logit  model,  a  probit  model  and  a  Heckman  probit
odel  that  allows  consistent  estimates  to  be  obtained  in  the
resence  of  sample  selection  problems.17 My  results  show
hat  differentials  in  CFL--PC  transitions  are  not  explained  by
ifferences  in  characteristics  (the  %  explained  is  approxi-
ately  −6%).  Examining  the  changes  in  the  characteristics,
t  rather  appears  that  the  introduction  of  the  Treu  Reform
hould  have  increased  the  transitions  toward  PCs.  Changes  in
ndividual  characteristics  explain  more  about  APC--PC  transi-
ions  (approximately  35%  according  to  the  Probit  model  and
pproximately  30%  according  to  the  Heckman  Probit  model).
hese  ﬁndings  appear  to  conﬁrm  that  changes  in  the  tran-
ition  rates  are  more  likely  to  depend  on  changes  in  the
stimated  parameters,  i.e.,  shifts  in  ﬁrms’  hiring  preferen-
es  or  other  unobservable  factors,  possibly  conﬁrming  that
he  effects  of  the  Treu  Reform  are  not  simply  restricted  to
redictable  changes  due  to  new  legislation.
. Conclusions
he  1997  ‘‘Treu  Act’’  reformed  the  Italian  labor  market  ‘‘at
he  margin’’.  Among  other  provisions,  this  act  extended  the
pplicability  of  OJTCs  (including  CFL  and  APCs),  made  their
onversion  into  PCs  more  favorable  and  reinforced  their
raining  role.
Through  applying  a  MNL  model  to  1995--1999  WHIP  data,
 found  that  although  the  Treu  Reform  emphasized  the
JTC (a CFL if the starting contract is a CFL, and an APC if the
tarting contract is an APC). Eliminating the other OJTC should be
egligible because transitions across different OJTCs are a residual
henomenon.
17 In the Heckman probit model, both the selection and the out-
ome equation consist in a binary response variable (work/not work
n the ﬁrst one and PC/OJTC in the second one).
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draining  role  of  OJTCs,  both  the  CFL--PC  and  the  APC--PC
fter-12-month  transitions  decreased  in  the  post-reform
eriod.
However,  some  differences  emerged  in  the  post-reform
ehavior  in  the  CFL  and  APC  ﬂows  out.  The  reduction  in  the
FL--PC  transitions  has  been  balanced  by  an  increase  in  both
FL--NW  and  CFL--CFL  transitions,  while  the  reduction  in  the
PC--PC  transitions  has  been  smaller  and  accompanied  by  a
trong  increase  in  APC--APC  transitions  and  a  reduction  in
PC--NW  transitions.  This  result  could  be  viewed  as  a  con-
equence  of  the  signiﬁcant  age-limit  extensions  brought  to
PCs  by  the  Treu  Reform.
Robustness  checks  show  that  the  Treu  Reform  led  to
arameter  instability,  at  least  for  the  OJTC--PC  transition
hannels.  More  importantly,  the  reduction  in  the  OJTC--PC
ransition  probabilities  is  largely  explained  by  changes  in
eturns’  characteristics  and  the  presence  of  unobservable
actors  (particularly  for  CFL--PC  transitions).  Among  oth-
rs,  this  ﬁnding  suggests  a  shift  in  ﬁrms’  hiring  preferences,
ather  than  changes  in  characteristics  per  se,  even  though
his  latter  factor  has  played  a  role  concerning  the  ﬂows  out
rom  APCs.
Our  ﬁndings  possibly  suggest  that  the  training  contents
f  OJTCs  are  of  little  importance,  at  least  for  manual  work-
rs,  whereas  the  ﬂexibility  contents  of  OJTCs  have  been
mphasized  in  the  Italian  labor  market.  A  possible  expla-
ation  is  the  weakness  of  the  Italian  skilled  labor  demand,
hich  tends  to  lower  the  need  to  hire  workers  with  a  speciﬁc
raining  path.
A further  difference  between  CFLs  and  APCs  concerns  the
ole  of  tenure  and  previous  job  training  in  affecting  transi-
ions  toward  PCs.  Although  a positive  role  of  human  capital
ccumulation  exists  in  both  cases,  the  effect  of  the  Treu
eform  diverges  between  the  OJTC  types.  In  fact,  while  the
reu  Reform  has  increased  the  positive  effect  of  both  factors
or  CFL--PC  transitions,  it  has  decreased  the  positive  effect
or  APC--PC  transitions.  This  result  suggests  that  CFL  work-
rs  that  transition  into  PCs  move  more  rapidly  than  in  the
ost-reform  period,  whereas  the  opposite  occurs  for  APC--PC
ransitions.  This  result  suggests  that  ﬁrms’  opportunity  cost
f  not  hiring  trained  workers  with  a  PC  is  lower  than  the  cost
f  renouncing  the  ﬂexibility  of  APCs.  Our  results  also  conﬁrm
he  existence  of  gender  and  territorial  dualities,  although
he  introduction  of  the  Treu  reform  reduced  North/South
isparities.
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In  conclusion,  our  ﬁndings  open  questions  about  the
effectiveness  of  on-the-job  training  activities  and  about  the
level  of  monetary  incentives  to  hire  OJTC  workers  perma-
nently.  Policies  aimed  at  making  the  role  of  OJTCs  more
effective  should  consider  the  training  content  and  the  mon-
etary  incentive  levels  necessary  to  make  OJTC  workers  more
desirable  for  ﬁrms.  These  considerations  appear  particularly
relevant  for  labor  markets  with  a  weak  demand  for  skilled
workers.  Furthermore,  policies  ought  to  include  speciﬁc
measures  in  favor  of  disadvantages  workers,  i.e.,  women
and  Southern  workers.
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